The climax was reached on 30th March, 1885, when the Russians drove off the Afghans from Panjdeh and occupied it. Even the pacific Government of Gladstone was roused to the frenzy of war. Mobilisation was ordered and a vote of credit for military preparations was moved in Parliament, The war, which appeared almost inevitable, was averted by the dexterity of Gladstone. The two nations at last came to terms. The Russians retained Panjdeh, but the Zulfikar pass was given to the Amir.
After this amicable settlement, the relations between Russia and the British Government improved. In 1886 the Commission for delimitation of boundaries concluded its labours and the Russo-Afghan boundary from the Oxus to the Zulfikar Pass was formally laid down. For six years uninterrupted peace followed. But in 1892 disputes again broke out over the Russian claim over the whole of the Pamirs. At last an agreement was reached in 1895, and the boundary-line in this region was formally fixed up. This brought to an end for the time being the long-standing rivalry between England and Russia over Asiatic empires. The English kept a firm hold on Afghanistan, and Russia directed her energy further towards the east.
Henceforth for several years the North-West Frontier policy of India was confined to relations with Afghanistan. The main problem was the position of the wild hill-tribes, which lived in the regions lying between Afghan and British territories and owed allegiance to neither. In pursuance of what has been termed the “Forward Policy”, the British Government desired to extend its power over them, so that the frontier of British India might be pushed far beyond the Indus. After some difficulties the two Governments came to an understanding regarding their spheres of influence. The Afghan Boundary Commission under Sir Mortimer Durand formally laid down the boundary-line. The Amir’s subsidy was raised from twelve to eighteen lakhs a year, and he agreed not to interfere with the tribes on the Indian side of the frontier line.
The next problem was to deal effectively with these tribes. This proved no easy task, and punitive expeditions were necessary to quell the turbulent clansmen. A formal protectorate was declared over Chitral and Gilgit in 1893, but two years later the British Officer sent to Chitral to help one of the rival candidates for the throne, was besieged by a large number of tribes who had declared Jihad or holy war against the British. The siege lasted for a month and a half, until a relieving army proceeded from Gilgit and another by way of the Malakand Pass. Again in 1897 there was a serious outbreak of hostilities. A large number of tribes, including the Mohmands and the Afridis, rose in revolt, and regular military expeditions, notably the Tirah campaign, were necessary to put them down.
To prevent the recurrence of these outbreaks strategic roads and railways were built in the frontier districts and distribution of troops was made to cope with them more effectively and expeditiously. The frontier districts were separated from the Punjab and created into a North-West Frontier Province ruled over by a Chief Commissioner, immediately under the Governor- General, and subsequently by a Governor.
These measures did not prove successful in keeping the region quiet and free from disturbances. Occasional raids into British territory and other disturbances by the hill tribes came to be a permanent feature, and even the British Government had to resort to bombing from aeroplanes to strike terror into them. In the light of these subsequent events we can appreciate the wisdom of Amir ‘Abdur Rahman when he described the probable results of the British forward policy in the following terms, in a letter written to Lord Lansdowne (1888-1894):
“If you should cut them (the hill tribes) out of my dominions they will neither be of any use to you nor to me. You will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them and they will always go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies.”
The advocates of the forward policy on the other hand supported the intrusion of the British into these hill territories, as it gave them a better line of defence than the River Indus against any invasion from the west. This is perhaps correct from a strictly military point of view. But the enormous trouble and expense involved can be justified only if there was a real danger of a serious invasion from the west. Such danger was undoubtedly very remote when the policy was first adopted. But in the light of later events which no one could then have foreseen the threat could not be described as altogether an imaginary one.
Annexation of Upper Burma
As a result of two wars the British had occupied Arakan, Tenasserim and Pegu in Lower Burma. The old Burmese dynasty was ruling in Upper Burma, and a British Resident was stationed in Mandalay, where the capital was removed in 1857. Trade was opened with Upper Burma and English rights were safeguarded by two treaties in 1862 and 1867.
The relations between the two Governments were, however, never cordial. The loss of Lower Burma was a source of irritation to the Burmese king, Mindon, while his medieval idea of royal prestige was irritating to the British. According to the Burmese custom, the British Resident, when attending court, had to remove his shoes and kneel before the king. In 1876 the Viceroy objected to this, but Mindon would not yield. The result was that the British Residents ceased to visit the king and in consequence British influence at the Burmese court declined to some extent.
Mindon’s successor, Thibaw, was a weak and vicious king. He signalised his succession by the massacre of eighty princes and princesses whom he feared as possible rivals. The British Resident protested, but was curtly reminded by the court that Burma was a sovereign power. The Chief Commissioner of Pegu recommended the withdrawal of the Resident, but the Government of India refused. Thibaw repeated the massacre in 1884. There was an outcry in the name of humanity, and public meetings held in Rangoon urged upon the Indian Government immediate annexation of Upper Burma. It is to be noted, however, that the Burmese population did not attend these meetings, which were really arranged by the English and Chinese merchants, whose main interest was trade. The Government of India took no notice of these events, and were content to let Burmese affairs alone.
A new element was, however, added about this time in North-Eastern politics. France had established a colonial empire in the Far East. In 1884 she possessed Cochin-China and Tonkin, and was pushing towards Upper Burma. The Burmese Government was anxious for the friendship of France. In 1885 a trade treaty was signed between the two powers and the French secretly promised to allow importation of arms into Burma through Tonkin. A French Consul was stationed at Mandalay, and there were semi-official negotiations for opening a French bank at the city, starting a railway, and securing the management of royal monopolies.
