Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier
THE period from 1858, when the Government of India began to be conducted in the name of the Sovereign of England, to 1937, when “provincial autonomy” was inaugurated under the reformed constitution of 1935, marks a distinct epoch in Indian history. The age is capable of a twofold division, viz., the Era of Imperialism (1858-1905) and the Epoch of Reforms (1905-1937). A noticeable feature of the age was the control exercised by one of the British Sovereign’s principal Secretaries of State over Indian administration. Nowhere was this more apparent than in foreign policy. Indeed it would be hardly any exaggeration to say that from 1858 onwards the foreign policy of India was dictated in large measure by European conditions and formed a part of the foreign policy of the British Government in Whitehall in London.
Regarding the North-West Frontier, the policy was for a long period based on the relations betweenQUEEN VICTORIA England and Russia. After the first Afghan War there was a revival of friendly feeling between the two countries. In 1844 the Russian Emperor Nicholas I visited Queen Victoria and an understanding was arrived at in respect of Central Asia. The basis of the agreement was that the khanates (principalities) of Bukhara, Khiva, and Samarqand should be left “as a neutral zone between the two empires in order to preserve them from a dangerous contact”.
These friendly relations were, however, rudely disturbed by the Crimean War, and Russia, foiled in southeastern Europe, resumed her forward policy in Central Asia. The rapid progress of Russia towards the border of Afghanistan was a cause of alarm and anxiety to the British Government. The conquest of the Punjab and Sind had extended the British possessions up to the hills of Afghanistan, and that country alone now stood between the advanced Russian outposts and the British Empire in India. But unhappily affairs in Afghanistan about that time proved unfavorable to the British.
After the conclusion of the First Afghan War, the relations between the British Government and Dost Muhammad, the Amir of Kabul, were, on the whole, friendly. When the Persians threatened Herat and Qandahar, the Amir made overtures for help to the British, and a treaty was concluded in 1855.
By this treaty the Indian Government undertook not to violate the territory of the Amir, and the latter agreed to be “the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company”.
The friendship was put to the test in 1856 when the Persians again besieged Herat. The British not only helped the Amir with money and arms, but also declared war against Persia, and sent a force from Bombay. The Persians came to terms in 1857.
The friendly feeling was first disturbed in 1862 when Dost Muhammad became aggressive and attacked Herat, then held by an independent Chief. The Government of India disapproved of this action and recalled its Muslim agent who had been installed in Kabul since 1857. Dost Muhammad paid no heed to the protest and succeeded in conquering Herat in 1863.
Shortly after this Dost Muhammad died at the age of eighty, and the inevitable struggle for succession broke out among his sixteen sons. For five years Afghanistan became a scene of fratricidal wars, with all the attendant evils of discord, disunion and partition of territories. At last in 1868 Sher ‘Ali, the third son of the late Amir and his chosen successor, defeated all his rivals and united the whole of Afghanistan under his rule.
The position of the British during this period was one of extreme difficulty. Sir John Lawrence (Governor- General, 1864-69) adopted a policy of strict neutrality, and logically followed the principle that the relations of the British Government are with the actual rulers of Afghanistan. Accordingly he refused help to the several contending brothers who asked for it, and recognized each of them in turn as soon as he established himself in Kabul. Sher Ali had thrice approached the British Government for help and was thrice refused. As soon, however, as he proved successful in the contest, Lawrence recognized him and sent him money, which enabled him finally to consolidate his position.
The policy followed by Lawrence has been characterised by some as one of “masterly inactivity”, but it has been severely condemned by others. His policy of neutrality was dictated by the fear that if he took up the cause of one rival, the other was sure to seek the aid of Russia or Persia. Against this it is pointed out that this contingency was almost inevitable whether the British Government interfered or not. It is however overlooked that the neutrality of the British would legitimately entitle them to prevent any interference from outside if and when it did occur, whereas if Lawrence actively backed up one candidate he could hardly, with justice or reason, prevent Russia or Persia from supporting another. In any case it must be admitted that he succeeded in isolating the Afghan Civil War and prevented any international complication.
The critics of Lawrence no doubt imply that if he had actively supported a rival candidate and enabled him to win the throne, the British could have easily a firm footing in Afghanistan, and effectively stopped for ever the Russian influence in that quarter. The experience of the First Afghan War was, however, entirely against any such anticipation, and Lawrence might, after all, have backed the wrong horse and atoned heavily for it. With this serious danger in view, and the almost inevitable complication of a Russian war, Lawrence might well be excused if he chose to follow a more cautious policy.
It was one of those enterprises where success would make it an act of far-sighted statesmanship, and failure, brand it as a rash and foolish adventure.
