The peaceful penetration of the French alarmed the British Government, but they could do nothing, as they had no casus belli or ostensible ground for interference. This was, however, supplied by an action of Thibaw’s. An English firm–the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation–took lease of some forests from the Government of Burma on condition of paying a fixed amount per log. But the Company was charged with having defrauded the Government of a heavy amount. A regular trial was held and the Company was condemned to pay a fine of more than 23 lakhs of rupees. The Company influenced the Government of India, which demanded that the case should be referred to the arbitration of the Viceroy. This, the Burmese king refused. Unfortunately for him, the French at this moment suffered serious reverses in Tonkin and withdrew from Upper Burma. The French ambassador in London repudiated the semi-official negotiations of the French Consul at Mandalay. The British seized this golden opportunity and struck hard. An ultimatum was sent to King Thibaw asking him to submit to the following terms:
I. A permanent Resident should be stationed at Mandalay, and he should have free access to the king without degrading ceremonies like taking off shoes and kneeling down.
2.The foreign policy of Burma should be controlled by the British.
3.The case of the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation should be settled in consultation with a special envoy to be sent by the Viceroy.
4.The Burmese Government should assist British trade with Yunnan.
Thibaw’s rejection of the ultimatum on 9th November, 1885, led to the British invasion. Within twenty days Mandalay was occupied and Thibaw found himself a prisoner in his own palace. But the fall of the capital did not mean the fall of the kingdom. A sort of guerilla warfare was maintained by bands of robbers and disbanded soldiers. It took five years to pacify and consolidate the kingdom of Upper Burma, and another six years to bring under effective control the areas ruled over by border tribes such as the Shins and the Chins. The conquered territories, added to Lower Burma, formed the new Province of Burma with headquarters at Rangoon.
The case of Burma affords an interesting parallel to that of Afghan on the opposite frontier. In both British policy was dictated by the fear that another first-class European power, Russia or France, would establish political influence in an Asiatic State bordering on British territories. The rulers of these States defied the English in the hope of obtaining aid from the rival European power, and in both cases they were disappointed at the critical moment. Only the geographical and ethical factors made the sequel different. Burma was added to British India, but the high and rugged mountain ranges of Afghanistan and the fierce warlike Pathans made the thorough conquest of that country a more formidable task.
The Indian States
The relations of the British Government with the Indian States underwent a great change after the assumption of the Government by the Crown. Before that the relations were neither uniform nor well defined. The first defect was indeed inevitable, because different States had concluded different types of treaty at different times and in different circumstances. As regards the second, the policy of a growing power like the British was naturally modified from time to time in consequence of various circumstances and influences. Much also depended upon the personal factor. Wellesley, Lord Hastings, and Dalhousie, as we have already seen, adopted a far more aggressive attitude than others, although no new policy was formulated by the Company during their regime.
The result was a state of uncertainty and perplexity in the Indian States. They did not know exactly where they stood. Theoretically their existence as a separate political entity was guaranteed by treaties, and many of them enjoyed an independent status, subject only to certain specified restrictions. In practice, however, many States were annexed by the British (such as Oudh, Satara, Nagpur, Jhansi, and the Carnatic) and in many others (such as Bharatpur, Mysore, and Gwalior) the British had not only interfered with the internal administration, but either deposed or definitely lowered the status of the Chiefs.
In 1841 the Court of Directors definitely adopted the policy ” of abandoning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue “, and Dalhousie carried this policy to its extreme limit. The outbreak of revolt in 1857 served as a lurid comment on this policy, and when the Government was transferred to the Crown, an entire reorientation of policy towards the Native States took place. Like many other changes in British India, this new relation was only slowly and gradually evolved, partly by written declaration of policy, but mainly by precedents and conventions.
The new policy was heralded by a definite pledge in the Queen’s proclamation that “We desire no extension of our present territorial possession”. This declaration would not perhaps have solved the problem, were it not accompanied by other steps to ensure its faithful observance. The two main grounds for recent annexations were (1) failure of natural heirs, and (2) misgovernment of native rulers. Means had to be devised to deal with them before the policy of non-annexation could be carried into practice.
The first offered a simple solution, and it was readily adopted. In 1860 sanads were granted to princes by which, on failure of natural heirs, the Hindu chiefs were authorised to adopt sons, and the Muslim chiefs to regulate their succession in any manner sanctioned by the Muslim law. These ” Sanads of adoption “, as they were called, guaranteed the perpetuity of States.
As regards misgovernment, matters were more complex and obviously could not be dealt with by any fixed rule. To judge from the actual events that took place after 1858, it appears that the new policy was to punish the ruler for misgovernment, and, if necessary, to depose him, but not to annex the State for his misdeeds. A corollary to this new policy was to interfere in the internal administration before misgovernment could reach such proportions as would justify more drastic measures. A few concrete instances will explain the trend of the new policy.
The most important case is that of Malhar Rao Gaikwar. He was guilty of gross misgovernment, and Colonel Phayre, the Resident, exposed the abuses of his administration. Thereupon the Gaikwar is alleged to have made an attempt to poison the Resident by mixing diamond dust with his food (November, 1874). Lord Northbrook had the Gaikwar arrested in January, 1875, and appointed a Commission for his trial. The Commission included three Indians and three Englishmen, and was presided over by the Chief justice of Bengal. The Commission were divided in their opinion. The three Englishmen held the Gaikwar guilty of the charge, but the three eminent Indian members–the Maharajas of Gwalior and Jaipur, and Sir Dinkar Rao–were of opinion that the charge was not proved. The Government of India accordingly acquitted the Gaikwar of the charge of attempted murder, but deposed him for ” his notorious misconduct, his gross mis- government of the State, and his evident incapacity to carry into effect necessary reforms”.
A new Gaikwar was installed on the throne. The choice fell upon a boy named Sayaji Rao who was distantly connected with the ruling family. Arrangements were made for the proper education and training of the boy, and Sir T. Madhava Rao ably administered the State during his minority. The boy who was thus called to the throne became one of the most enlightened rulers of India, and under his paternal guidance Baroda became one of the most progressive States in the whole of India. He died in January, 1939.
The case of Manipur affords another illustration of the new policy. The new Maharaja, Sura-Chandra, was deposed as a result of a palace revolution on 21st September, 1890. The Senapati, Tikendrajit, an able and popular man, was suspected of instigating it, though there was no positive evidence in this respect. Sura-Chandra sought British help for his restoration. The Political Agent, Mr. Grimwood, was against it. After an interview between Lord Lansdowne, the Viceroy, and Mr. Quinton, the Chief-Commissioner of Assam, towards the end of February, 1891, the Government of India decided to recognise Kula-Chandra, the second brother, as the Maharaja of Manipur on his agreeing to the following conditions: (1) to govern the kingdom according to the advice of the Political Agent: (2) to allow the Political Agent to maintain 300 soldiers in the Residency: and (3) to deport Tikendrajit from Manipur. To give effect to these Mr. Quinton started for Manipur in March, 1891, with an escort of 400 Gurkha soldiers and a few civilians. When Mr. Quinton wanted to arrest Tikendra it in his house on 24th March, the latter offered a strong resistance with Manipur soldiers and the British force had to fall back to the Residency. The Manipuri soldiers even attacked the Residency and when the British position was almost hopeless there was a cease-fire. An interview was arranged with Tikendrajit in which Mr. Quinton, Mr. Grimwood, Lieutenant Simpson and two other Englishmen were present. But the negotiations failed and when the British party proceeded towards the gate they were attacked by an excited mob and without the knowledge of Tikendrajit four Englishmen were murdered by Tongol General. The rest returned to British territory on 31st March.
