Sind had an ambitious neighbour in the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, who coveted it as a natural sphere of expansion for his empire. But his attempts were thwarted by his friends, the English, who in their turn lost no opportunity of increasing their influence over that territory. Thus in 1831 Lord William Bentinck opposed Ranjit Singh’s proposal for a partition of Sind. But the Amirs of Sind had to conclude a treaty with the British Government, rather reluctantly, on the 20th April, 1832, which provided that “the rivers and roads” of Sind should be opened to the “merchants and traders of Hindostan”, but that no “military stores” and “armed vessels or boats” should come through these. As a sort of precaution against the apprehended absorption of their territory by the British, the Amirs took care to include another stipulation to the effect that “the two contracting powers bind themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other”. The treaty was renewed in 1834. Up to 1838 Ranjit Singh often contemplated the incorporation of Sind into his empire, but was thwarted by the English, who now with a view to strengthening the ties by which the Amirs of Sind were “connected with the British Empire” proceeded to extort from them favourable terms as a reward for their protection against Sikh aggression. By a treaty concluded on the 20th April, 1838, Lord Auckland forced on them an accredited British Resident. In fact, Sind soon fell out of the frying-pan into the fire. Sikh ambition in regard to it could not be realised, but it was to pay a high price for the uncalled-for British protection by being deprived of its independence through questionable means adopted by British officers.
On the outbreak of the First Anglo-Afghan War, the English in violation of the treaty of 1832, took an armed force through Sind, and informed the Amirs that “while the present exigency lasts . . . the article of the treaty (of 1832) prohibiting the use of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores must necessarily be suspended”. Greater humiliation and loss were inflected on the Amirs when Lord Auckland demanded from them a heavy sum ” a price for unsolicited British mediation in effecting a commutation of the pecuniary demands of Shah Shuja on Sind. The Amirs, who had stopped the payment of any tribute to Shah Shuja during his thirty years’ exile and had also been granted an exemption by Shah Shuja in 1833 from all, naturally hesitated to comply with Lord Auckland’s demand. But they were given a warning to the effect that the British Government had the “power to crush and annihilate them, and . . . will not hesitate to call it into action, should it appear requisite, however remotely, for either the integrity or safety” of the Empire, or its frontiers. The Amirs had no other option but to submit to the Governor-General’s exaction. Further, the threat of Sir John Keane’s march on the capital of Sind compelled them to accept fresh terms from Lord Auckland in February, 1839, by which they were bound to pay a sum of three lacs of rupees per annum for the maintenance of a British force in their territories, and Sind was “formally placed under British protection “. This treaty was again revised by Lord Auckland and his advisers in their own way and was sent back for final signature to the Amirs, who “objected, implored and finally gave way, by affixing their seals to the revised documents “.
A worse fate was, however, in store for Sind. She had been intimidated and coerced by Lord Auckland; but his successor went further and imposed on her the yoke of British authority by sheer force. During the critical years of the disastrous Afghan War, the province had been utilized as a base of operations by the British Government, and its Amirs had remained steadfastly loyal to their agreements with the English. But far from being duly rewarded for their attachment, the Amirs were unjustly charged with disaffection and hostility against the British Government by Lord Ellenborough, who sought a convenient pretext to give effect to his design of annexing Sind. To make matters easy for himself, the new Governor-General removed Major James Outram, the Resident at Hyderabad, who had some experience of local affairs, and sent to Sind Sir Charles Napier with full civil and military powers as a representative of the Governor-General. Sir Charles Napier, a hot-headed and impulsive officer, who came to Sind on 10th September, 1842, acted on “the theory that the annexation of Sind would be a very beneficent piece of rascality for which it was his business to find an excuse-a robbery to be plausibly effected”. He took it for granted that the vague charges against the Amirs had been proved, and, besides arbitrarily interfering in a succession quarrel at Khairpur, dictated a new treaty by which the Amirs were required to cede certain important territories in lieu of the tribute of three lacs, to provide fuel for British vessels navigating the Indus, and to give up the right of coining money in favour of the British Government. He did not stop with these demands, which amounted to an absolute surrender of national independence by the Amirs, but acted as if Sind had already become a part of the British Empire and “as though the right of the Governor-General of British India to parcel it out at his pleasure was unquestioned and unquestionable; and, moreover, as if it were desired to exercise this right in a manner as offensive as possible to those who were to suffer privation from the exercise”. Thus before the acceptance of a fresh treaty by the Amirs, he occupied the territory in question, and issued proclamations in strong language. Further, while talking of treaties, he sought to intimidate the Amirs by marching upon lmamgarh, a famous desert fortress lying between Khairpur and Hyderabad, without formally declaring war, and destroying it early in January, 1843.
These high-handed acts of Napier sorely tried the patience of the warlike Baluchis, and in a state of excitement they attacked the British Residency on the 15th February, 1843, whereupon Outram, who had returned to Sind as a British Commissioner, fled for refuge to a steamer. Thus war was now openly declared. A Baluchi army of about 22,000 men was defeated on the 17th February at Miani, a few miles from Hyderabad, by Napier fighting with 2,800 men and 12 guns. This was followed by the immediate submission of some of the Amirs, but Sher Muhammad, “the lion of Mirpur “, still held out bravely. He was, however, thoroughly vanquished on the 24th March at Dabo, six miles from Hyderabad, whereupon Napier occupied Mirpur on the 27th March, Amarkot on the 4th April and conveyed the news of his victory to Lord Ellenborough in the punning message, “Peccavi”, i.e. ” I have Sind “. Sher Muhammad was driven out of Sind in June and the war came to a close. Sind was formally annexed to the British Empire in August, 1843, and the Amirs were exiled. Napier unhesitatingly accepted 70,000 pounds as his share of the prize money, while Outram, in spite of being a man of comparatively small resources, did not take his own share amounting to 3,000 pounds, but gave it to some charitable institutions. Outram, in fact, had no liking for Napier’s policy and wrote to him: “I am sick of policy; I will not say yours is the best, but undoubtedly it is the shortest–that of the sword. Oh, how I wish you had drawn it in a better cause!”
The policy of Lord Ellenborough, and the high-handed acts of Sir Charles Napier, with regard to Sind, have been justly condemned by most writers. There in no doubt that they acted on purely imperialistic motives and resorted to highly objectionable means, by cynical violations of treaty obligations, to reduce the Amirs, who had inflicted no injury on the British, to a state of vassalage. “If the Afghan episode,” observes Innes, “is the most disastrous in our annals, that of Sind is morally even less excusable.” While trying to defend the policy by various laboured arguments, which are at once irrational and unhistorical, Napier has admitted in his Diary: “We have no right to seize Sind, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful humane piece of rascality it will be.” Strangely enough, the Court of Directors, while condemning the policy of anneexing Sind, did nothing to undo the wrong. Napier was appointed the first Governor of Sind, and he tried hard during his rule of four years to consolidate British authority in the province.
