There is no doubt that the English secured important advantages out of the first Anglo-Burmese War. They deprived the Burmese of the greater part of their sea-coast, and Assam, Cachar and Manipur became practically their protectorates. But this cost them much in men and money, owing largely to the inefficiency and blunders both of the Governor-General, who being a man of mediocre abilities could not pursue a strong and consistent policy, and of the generals, who did not possess sufficient initiative to act promptly according to the needs of the situation. But for the timely despatch of reinforcements in men and provisions by Sir Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, the British troops in Burma would have been subject to greater hardships and the whole expedition might have been a failure. Though ultimately defeated, the Burmese soldiers, who, as Phayre admits, “fought under conditions which rendered victory . . . impossible ” for them, deserve credit for the manner in which they tried bravely to resist the invaders and the skill they displayed in building stockades. A writer competent in such matters has asserted that “the position and defences at Donoobew, as a field-work, would have done credit to the most scientific engineer “.
The early reverses and difficulties of the British in Burma gave rise to a conviction in certain quarters that the British dominion was faced with impending ruin. This resulted in risings in some places. In Bharatpur, the claim of the minor son of a deceased ruler, who had been placed on the throne with the consent of Sir David Ochterlony, the British Resident at Delhi, was contested by his cousin, Durjan Sal. Lord Amherst at first followed a policy of nonintervention, and disapproved of the conduct of Sir David Ochterlony in trying to enforce his decision at the point of the sword, which led to the latter’s resignation and the appointment of Sir Charles Metcalfe in his place. Sir David Ochterlony, an old man in bad health, soon died. The new Resident, Sir Charles Metcalfe, urged the necessity of vindicating the prestige of the British Government by opposing the pretensions of the usurper and won over the Governor-General to his view. An expedition was eventually sent under Lord Combermere, who in January, 1826, stormed the fortress of Bharatpur, which had resisted the attacks of Lord Lake in 1805. Durjan Sal was deported. Another disturbance that demands notice was the mutiny of the Sepoys at Barrackpore, which ” was only quelled after the mutinous regiments had been fired upon by the British artillery and the parade-ground made a shambles”.
The Second Anglo-Burmese War
Something more was needed even after the gains of the First Anglo-Burmese War to establish effective British control on the eastern frontier of India. The new King of Burma, Tharrawaddy (1837-1845), refused to consider the Treaty of Yandaboo to be binding on him, and technically his action was “within theBurmese constitution, whereby all existing rights lapsed at a new King’s accession until he chose to confirm them”. But this was opposed to British interests, which were affected also in other ways. The British Residents at the court of Ava did not receive courteous treatment, for which reason the Residency had to be finally withdrawn in 1840, and British merchants, who had settled on the southern coast of Burma after the treaty of 1826, complained of oppression at the hands of the Governor of Rangoon. The merchants asked the Calcutta Government to intervene in the matter in order to redress their grievances. Lord Dalhousie sent a frigate under Commodore Lambert to Pagan, the new King of Burma (1845-1852), who had succeeded to the throne after his father, Tharrawaddy, had been put under restraint on the ground of his insanity, to demand compensation for the losses of the British merchants and to ask for the removal of the governor of Rangoon. If the Governor-General sincerely desired a peaceful settlement, his object was not fulfilled by the despatch of a Commodore, which has rightly been considered to be an necessarily provocative measure. Dalhousie himself observed later on that “these commodores are too combustible for negotiations”.
The King of Burma, inclined to avoid war, gave a courteous reply to Lambert’s demands, removed the old governor and sent a new officer to settle the matter peacefully. But when a deputation of some senior naval officers sent by Lambert to the new governor was refused admission on the pretext that he was asleep, the British Commodore felt insulted, declared the port of Rangoon to be in a state of blockade and seized a ship of the Burmese king’s. At this the Burmese batteries opened fire on the British frigate and the British Commodore returned the fire.
It appears from some documents that Lambert acted contrary to the Governor-General’s orders and the latter censured his precipitancy. But he did not disavow the Commodore’s act but rather “accepted the responsibility” for it and sent an ultimatum to the Burmese Government demanding compensation and an indemnity of 100,000, pounds to be paid by the lst April, 1852. At the same time, vigorous preparations were made under his personal supervision for the impending conflict with the Burmese so that the blunders of the First Anglo-Burmese War might be avoided. His ultimatum received no reply, and on the day it expired, Ist April, 1852, British forces under General Godwin, a veteran of the First Anglo – Burmese War, and Admiral Austen, reached Rangoon. Martaban fell quickly; the famous pagoda of Rangoon was stormed on the 14th April; and Bassein, situated on the north-west corner of the Irrawaddy delta, was captured about a month later. Dalhousie went to Rangoon in September; Prome was occupied in October and Pegu in November. The Governor-General had no desire to advance into Upper Burma but stipulated that the conquests in the lower part of the country should be recognised by the King of Burma by a formal agreement. On the refusal of the King to conclude such a treaty, he annexed Pegu or Lower Burma by a proclamation on the 20th December, 1852.
