Though a great conqueror, Ranjit was not stern by nature but, on the other hand, showed kindness and consideration towards his fallen foes. Baron Carl von Hugel, a German traveller who visited Ranjit’s court in 1835, tells us that he never “wantonly imbued his hands in blood. Never perhaps was so large an empire founded by one man with so little criminality”. Ranjit was indeed a strong ruler with absolute control over his government, but he was not a tyrant “obsessed by the idea of over-centralization”. In his government “subordinate rights” were preserved; and his civil administration was far from being unduly severe, though it lacked certain features of a well-organized administration like elaborate laws, a fixed judiciary, or an efficient police. A contemporary British officer reports: “In a territory compactly situated, he has applied himself to those improvements which spring only from great minds and here we find despotism without its rigours, a despot without cruelty and a system of government far beyond the native institutions of the East, though far from the civilisation of Europe”. Manufactures and trade flourished in Ranjit’s kingdom. English writers have praised the Sikh king for his “statesmanlike recognition of the strength of the East India Company, the reliance he placed upon British promises, and his loyalty to his plighted word”, in which respect he differed both from Hyder and Tipu. But it is noted by some critics that he displayed a lack of intrepidity and bold statesmanship in his dealings with the English. He created a Sikh kingdom but took no steps to prevent British dominion, of which he had a presentiment when he said “sab lal ho jayega”; he chose instead the line of least resistance.
he First Anglo-Sikh War
The structure of the Sikh military monarchy built up by Ranjit was not destined to last long. As is the case with such systems, its continuance or growth depended on the guidance of a strong personality, particularly in view of the rapid march of British imperialism in India at that time. The Sikhs were at the height of their power at the time of Ranjit’s exit from this world; but “then it exploded”, as General Sir J. H. Gordon puts it, “disappearing in fierce but fading flames”. As a matter of fact, the death of Ranjit was the signal for the beginning of anarchy and confusion within his dominions, which, being prolonged, greatly weakened the Sikh power and ultimately led to its submission to the English. One weak ruler after another was deposed in quick succession till in 1843 Dalip Singh, a minor, was acknowledged as king with his mother, Rani Jhindan, as Regent. The struggles and convulsions of the period caused the collapse of the central civil government and resulted in the ascendancy of the Khalsa army through its delegates the Panchayets or Committees of five. Unrestrained by any strong authority, the army grew ungovernable and furious, and became the virtual dictator of the State. Unable to control the army or to defy it openly, the Lahore Darbar in its intense anxiety to get rid of this terrible incubus devised the plan of inducing it to invade British territory, in the belief that it would either be totally destroyed in the course of its war with the English or its “super-abundant energies” would be exhausted in a career of conquest. Thus the position was that the Sikh cause was almost doomed before the war broke out owing to the half-heartedness of its leaders; and the English, as Roberts points out, fought “against a fine army without a general, or, at any rate, without one supreme controlling mind”.
Besides the activities of the Darbar, some provocative acts on the part of the English, which served to convince the Sikh army of the desire of “their colossal neighbor” to take their country and destroy their independence, egged it on to enter upon a war. The English sent bodies of troops towards the Sutlej; during 1844 and 1845 they were preparing boats at Bombay with the object of constructing bridges across the Sutlej; troops were equipped in the newly-conquered territory of Sind for an attack on Multan; and the various garrisons in the north-west districts were being gradually strengthened. To the Sikh army, all this was “held to denote”, writes Cunningham, “a campaign, not of defence, but of aggression”.
Thus the Sikh army’s apprehensions of a British attack on the Sikh territory, at a time when the East India Company had been definitely pursuing a policy of annexation, were not unfounded. The Khalsa crossed the Sutlej unopposed on the 11th December, 1845, not through any lack of preparations on the part of the English, whose army in the frontier districts had been already reinforced, and had increased to 40,000 men and 100 guns, but owing to the personal misconceptions and negligence of Major Broadfoot, the British commander at Ferozepore. The Governor-General, Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Hardinge, promptly rose to the occasion. He issued a proclamation of war on the 13th December, 1845, and declared all Sikh possessions on the left bank of the Sutlej confiscated and annexed to the British dominions. The first battle, fought at Mudki, situated twenty miles to the south-east of Ferozepore, between the combined Ambala and Ludhiana branches of the British troops under the command of Sir Hugh Gough and the Sikh army under Lal Singh, was sharp and bloody. The brave Sikh infantry vigorously charged the Sepoys and European soldiers, who at first reeled before the accurate fire of the enemy. But the supineness of LaI Singh at a critical moment spoiled the chances of the Sikhs, who were in the end defeated with heavy losses. The English casualties were also heavy: 657 of their soldiers were wounded and 215, including Major-General Sir Robert Sale, the defender of Jalalabad, and Major-General Sir John McCaskill, were killed. The British army next attacked the Sikh entrenchments at Feroze Shah (Firuzshuhur), about twelve miles from the Sutlej, on the 2Ist December, 1845. The Sikhs offered a stubborn and formidable resistance and repulsed battalion after battalion by furious firing. The English were indeed faced with a grave situation. “During that night of horrors,” the Commander-in-Chief wrote later, “we were in a critical and perilous state.” But the brave Sikh warriors were again betrayed by their general, Tej Singh, who left the field all of a sudden. Thus the Sikhs ultimately gave up the battle, to the immense relief of their adversaries, and retreated across the Sutlej. “Had a guiding mind directed the movements of the Sikh army,” observes Malleson, “nothing could have saved the exhausted British.” The losses on both sides were heavy. On the English side 694 men were killed, including 103 officers, and 1,721 were wounded; and the Sikhs lost 8,000 men and 73 guns.
After their victory at Feroze Shah, the British army remained somewhat “paralyzed ” for some time waiting for guns, ammunition and stores from Delhi, when the Sikhs again crossed the Sutlej under Ranjur Singh Majhithia in January, 1846, and attacked the frontier station of Ludhiana. Sir Harry Smith (afterwards governor of Cape Colony), who was sent to check the advance of the Khalsa, was defeated in a skirmish at Buddewal on the 21st January. Reinforced by additional troops, he defeated the Sikhs, in spite of their brave resistance, at Aliwal, to the west of Ludhiana, on the 28th January, 1846. The vanquished army was deprived of sixty-seven guns and was driven across the Sutlej. The final battle took place at Sobraon on the Sutlej, where the main body of the Sikh army was strongly entrenched. Here also the Sikh soldiers showed wonderful steadfastness and resolution and fought from the early dawn of the 10th February “with the valour of heroes, the enthusiasm of crusaders, and the desperation of zealots sworn to conquer the enemy or die sword in hand.” But all this proved to be of no avail, owing to the half-heartedness and treachery of almost all the Sikh generals with the honourable exception of Sham Singh; and by about one p.m. the Sikhs were defeated and their formidable entrenchments were stormed by the British army. A large number of Sikhs were slaughtered by the infuriated British soldiers, while crossing the Sutlej; on the English side 320 were killed and 2,083 were wounded.
