SECOND ADHYÂYA.
The first adhyâya has proved that all the Vedânta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedânta, more especially the Sânkhya system. The task of the two first pâdas of the second adhyâya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedânta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedânta can be satisfactorily established.
PÂDA I.
Adhikarana I refutes the Sânkhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedânta system involves the rejection of the Sânkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Smriti, and as such has claims on consideration.–To accept the Sânkhya-smriti, the Vedântin replies, would compel us to reject other Smritis, such as the Manu-smriti, which are opposed to the Sânkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of Smritis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sânkhya-smriti, but rather those Smritis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause.
Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-smriti.
Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes–as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby become simple gold again–do not continue to exist in those causes.–Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sânkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal substance participating in the same characteristics.
Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the preceding adhikarana is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.
The one Sûtra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to Sankara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.–The Srî-bhâshya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sûtra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Râmânuga’s view, the Sûtra runs as follows: ‘If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.’ That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord’s having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.–The construction which Râmânuga puts on the Sûtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears
from a quotation made by Râmânuga from the Dramidabhâshyakâra 1.
Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedânta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vaiseshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause.–The divergent views of Sankara and Râmânuga on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.
Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sûtra-kâra remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.–The way in which the three Sûtras constituting this adhikarana are treated by Sankara on the one hand and Râmânuga on the other is characteristic. Râmânuga throughout simply follows the words of the Sûtras, of which Sûtra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as ‘Thou art that,’ while Sûtra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. Sankara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sûtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul’s fictitious limiting adjuncts.
Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.
Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to Sankara, because the world is unreal; according to Râmânuga, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.
Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.
Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.
Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.
Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman–omniscience and so on–are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.
PÂDA II.
The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.–The first adhikarana (1-10) is directed against the Sânkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhâna of the Sânkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.–The second adhikarana (11-17) refutes the Vaiseshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the adrishta.–The third and fourth adhikaranas are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vigñânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.–The last Sûtra of this adhikarana is treated by Râmânuga as a separate adhikarana refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.–Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Gainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.
The last adhikarana of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas or Pâñkarâtras. But Sankara and Râmânuga totally disagree as to the drift of the Sûtrakâra’s opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.–Sûtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated Sankarshana, i.e. the gîva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul’s eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sankarshana there springs Pradyumna, i. e. the manas.–The Sûtra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, ‘Or, on account of there being’ (or, ‘their being’) ‘knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.’–This means, according to Sankara, ‘Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sankarshana, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42 against the Bhâgavata doctrine. According to Râmânuga, on the other hand, the Sûtra has to be explained as follows: ‘Or, rather there is non-contradiction of that (i.e. the Pañkarâtra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i. e. on account of their being Brahman).’ Which means: Since Sankarshana and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pâñkarâtra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.–The form of the Sûtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the ‘vâ’ and of the ‘tat,’ implied in Râmânuga’s comment, are more natural than those resulting from Sankara’s interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine which–in spite of objections–has to be viewed as the true one.
