PÂDA III.
The third pâda discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i. e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.
The first seven adhikaranas treat of the five elementary substances.–Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.–Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.–Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally ‘that which is,’ cannot have originated from anything else.
Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.
Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.
Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.
The remainder of the pâda is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the gîva.–Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as ‘Devadatta is born,’ ‘Devadatta has died,’ strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.
Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.–This Sûtra is of course commented on in a very different manner by Sankara on the one hand and Râmânuga on the other. According to the former, the gîva is in reality identical–and as such co-eternal–with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul’s connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.–According to Râmânuga, the gîva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakâra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikâsa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sankoka) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarûpânyathâbhâva) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.
Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sûtra declares that the soul is ‘gña.’ This means, according to Sankara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vaiseshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent,
Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is anu, i. e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyâpin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.–In Sankara’s opinion the Sûtras 19-38 represent the pûrvapaksha view, according to which the gîva is anu, while Sûtra 29 formulates the siddhânta, viz. that the gîva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as anu in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ–which itself is anu–constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the samsâra.–According to Râmânuga, on the other hand, the first Sûtra of the adhikarana gives utterance to the siddhânta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sûtras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the Sûtras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sûtra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (gñâtri) stands to knowledge (gñâna).–In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.–Sankara maintains that Sûtras 19-28 state and enforce a pûrvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere primâ facie view is carried; in no other place the Sûtras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bonâ fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the pûrvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with Sankara, look upon Sûtra 29 as embodying a refutation of the pûrvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that Sankara’s interpretation of the Sûtra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word ‘prâgñavat’) the Sûtra runs as follows: ‘But on account of that quality (or “those qualities;” or else “on account of the quality–or qualities–of that”) being the essence, (there is) that designation (or “the designation of that”).’ This Sankara maintains to mean, ‘Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the samsâra state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as anu.’ Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first ‘tat’ by buddhi. And–which is more important–in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on Sankara’s own system the qualities of the buddhi–such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.–can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the samsâra state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to Sankara’s system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.
There are no similar difficulties in the way of Râmânuga’s interpretation of the adhikarana. He agrees with Sankara in the explanation of Sûtras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the pûrvapaksha, but the siddhânta. Sûtras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from Sankara’s, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vigñâna when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sûtra 29, ‘The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,’ i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term ‘knowledge’ is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The ‘tu’ of the Sûtra which, according to Sankara, is meant to discard the pûrvapaksha, serves on Râmânuga’s view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.
Of the three remaining Sûtras of the adhikarana (30-32), 30 explains, according to Sankara, that the soul may be called anu, since, as long as it exists in the samsâra condition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Râmânuga the Sûtra teaches that the soul may be called vigñâna because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.–Sûtra 31 intimates, according to Sankara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sûtra, according to Râmânuga, teaches that gñâtritva is properly said to constitute the soul’s essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.–In Sûtra 32, finally, Sankara sees a statement of the doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while, according to Râmânuga, the Sûtra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being gñâtri and anu, as it is in reality).–The three Sûtras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul’s connexion with the buddhi.
Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kartritva of the gîva, i. e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sûtras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to Sankara’s system, this cannot be the final view,–the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upâdhis,–he looks upon the next following Sûtra (40) as constituting an adhikarana by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, ‘just as the carpenter acts in both ways,’ i.e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.–Râmânuga, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sûtra 40 from the preceding Sûtras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.
Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.
Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Sûtra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (amsa) of Brahman, and the following Sûtras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely
different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman. According to Râmânuga the souls are in reality parts of Brahman 1; according to Sankara the ‘amsa’ of the Sûtra must be understood to mean ‘amsa iva,’ ‘a part as it were;’ the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.–One Sûtra (50) in this adhikarana calls for special notice. According to Sankara the words ‘âbhâsa eva ka.’ mean ‘(the soul is) a mere reflection,’ which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbavâda, i.e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sûtra 43 had propounded the so-called avakkhedavâda, i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.–According to Râmânuga the âbhâsa of the Sûtra has to be taken in the sense of hetvâbhâsa, a fallacious argument, and the Sûtra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedântins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts 1.
PÂDA IV.
Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the prânas (by which generic name are denoted the buddhîndriyas, karmen-driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (anu).
Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya prâna, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the prânas discussed above; and that it is minute (anu).
Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the prânas are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya prâna.
Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the nâmarûpavyâkarana) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord
