It was now clear, even to the most obtuse mind, that the British position in Madras would be irrevocably lost if Dupleix were left free to complete his designs. Fortunately for the English their new governor, Saunders, who took over charge in September, 1750, was more energetic than his predecessor. Under his guidance the English threw their whole weight into the struggle, and the home authorities, realizing the gravity of the situation, determined to back him up with all the resources at their disposal. Thus although there was then no regular declaration of war or even avowed hostility between the English and the French nations in Europe, they engaged in an open war in India, nominally as auxiliaries of the native powers, but really as the principals in a life-and-death struggle.
Had Dupleix been able to strike a decisive blow at Muhammad Ali before the English could come to his rescue he might have nullified altogether the belated efforts of his rivals. But he was out-manoeuvred by the clever diplomacy of his opponents. On the advice of the English, Muhammad ‘Ali kept up the negotiations opened by Dupleix, simply to gain time till the English were in a position to send effective assistance to him. Dupleix did not realise that he was being duped, till in May, 1751, a British detachment actually set out towards Trichinopoly. He then sent a French army under Law to capture the place, but Law proved hopelessly incompetent for the task. The siege of Trichinopoly dragged on, and by the end of the year the rulers of Mysore and Tanjore and the Maratha chief, Morari Rao, joined Muhammad ‘Ali and the English.
In the meantime events were marching rapidly in the north. Robert Clive, a civilian employee in Madras, had lately joined the army. He proposed an expedition against Arcot, which had been already suggested by Muhammad ‘Ali and approved of by the English governor, Saunders, as the best means of preventing the fall of Trichinopoly, for Chanda Sahib was sure to divert an effective part of his army to the protection of his capital. The proposal was accepted and Clive was entrusted with its execution. With only two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys he occupied Arcot without any serious opposition. As he foresaw, Chanda Sahib immediately sent a relieving force from Trichinopoly to recapture his capital. For fifty-three days Clive heroically defended the city till the forces withdrew (Sept.-Oct. 1751).
The capture of Arcot was the most remarkable achievement of the war. This daring exploit at once enhanced the reputation of the English as a fighting power and gave a curshing blow to the prestige of the French. Law, the French general in charge of the siege of Trichinpoloy, was unnerved by the success of Clive and took refuge on the island of Srirangam. At the instance of Robert Clive the English besieged the island. Dupleix sent reinforcements, but they surrendered to the English on June 9, 1752. Three days later Law and his troops became prisoners of the English. To complete the disaster of the French, Chanda Sahib surrendered and was beheaded by the Tanjorean general.
Dupleix’s high hopes were now dashed to the ground. By the incredible folly and incompetence of his generals he had lost the prize which was almost within his grasp. Still he worked on undaunted by recent reverses. He won over Morari Rao and the ruler of Mysore to his side and secured the neutrality of the Raja of Tanjore. He then began active operations (31st December, 1752) and renewed the siege of Trichinopoly. Minor military engagements took place throughout 1753 with alternate success and failure on both sides. Up to the very end Dupleix did not give up hope of taking Trichinopoly.
But the French authorities at home were thoroughly tired of Dupleix and decided to recall him. They never understood the full implications of the masterly policy of their gifted governor and were greatly concerned at the discomfiture of the French troops and the heavy financial losses which his policy involved. Accordingly they sent Godeheu to investigate the local conditions and take proper measures to retrieve the situation. Godeheu landed on lst August, 1754, superseded Dupleix, and reversed his policy. He opened negotiations with the English and concluded a treaty. The English and the French both agreed not to interfere in the quarrels of the native princes and each party was left in possession of the territories which it actually occupied at the time of the treaty.
Thus the French lost almost everything that Dupleix had gained for them. In the Deccan alone Dupleix’s policy still bore some fruit. By dint of extraordinary ability and energy, Bussy still maintained his influence there against the almost universal opposition of the nobility, who disliked the French and wanted to drive them out of the Deccan. Often Bussy thought of retiring to the Carnatic but was prevented by Dupleix, who steadily pursued the policy of maintaining an effective control at headquarters. By a masterly stroke of policy Bussy induced the Nizam to grant him the Northern Sarkars for the payment of his troops. These consisted of the four districts of Mustafanagar, Ellore, Rajahmundry and Chicacole, yielding an annual revenue of more than thirty lacs of rupees. But even this solid acquisition did not enable Bussy to render any substantial assistance to the French in the Carnatic in the most critical hours.
The subsequent history of the French in the Deccan and the Carnatic will be dealt with in due course. But before we leave the subject we may consider the causes which led to the failure of Dupleix. It is obviously beyond the scope of this work to discuss at length the different views held on this subject, both by contemporaries and later historians. Passions and prejudices have clouded the issues and an insufficient knowledge of the relevant material makes it impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion. We must, therefore, confine ourselves to a broad general review of the whole situation without descending into details.
It is agreed on all hands that the immediate and the main cause of Dupleix’s discomfiture was the failure of the home authorities to appreciate the merit of his plans and to support their execution by sending adequate assistance. It is, however, suggested that Dupleix alone was responsible for this, inasmuch as he never cared to take his superiors into his confidence or divulge his plans to them in all details until it was too late. But if this is true, it only reveals the inherent conviction of Dupleix, justified in a large measure by later events, that the Government of France were either unwilling or unable to devote serious attention to Indian issues and were always apt to view them as minor and subsidiary parts of their general policy. For while in England there was a private body, like the East India Company, whose whole interest was bound up with that of the English factories in India, the French trading concern was directly controlled by the Government, whose policy was naturally dictated by larger political issues. As a matter of fact, one of the chief reasons which induced them to settle amicably with the English in India was the fear of complications in America.
