The constitution, however, did not work well. The relation between the executive and the large number of justices of the peace was not clearly defined and there was constant conflict between the two. By an Act of 1876 the Corporation of Calcutta was reconstituted. It consisted of seventy-two members, two-thirds of whom were elected by rate-payers. In 1882 the number of elected members was raised to fifty, and the jurisdiction of the Municipality was extended by the addition of suburban areas.
The progressive development of the principles of self-government in the administration of the city of Calcutta was suddenly checked by Lord Curzon. By an Act passed in 1899 the number of members directly elected by the rate-payers was reduced to half the total strength, and the Chairman, nominated by the Government, was vested with large independent powers. The Corporation could only fix the rate of assessment and lay down the general policy. In the details of administration the only check upon the Chairman was a General Committee of twelve, of whom four were appointed by the elected Commissioners, four by the other Commissioners, and four by the Government.
The grounds for thus curtailing the powers of the people were that there was too much talk and too little action in the Corporation, and that the necessary driving power could only be secured by a strong independent executive unfettered by the control of the Corporation or its special Committees.
Needless to add, the measure evoked the strongest protest from the public. Mr. Surendranath Banerjee uttered one of his most eloquent denunciations when this measure was discussed in the Bengal Legislative Council. On the last day of the debate, 27th September, while opposing the bill for the last time, he remarked that the date “will be remembered by future generations of Bengalees as that which marks the extinction of local self-government” in the city of Calcutta.
As a protest against the measure, twenty-eight members of the Corporation, including Surendranath, tendered their resignation. By a curious irony of fate, it was left to Surendranath, as a Minister, to undo the great wrong-twenty-four years later.
Bombay
In Bombay, as in Calcutta, the old system was revived in 1865. Five hundred justices of the peace formed a corporate body for the administration of the town, with a highly-paid official, called Commissioner, as Chairman, and an independent Controller of Accounts. The system did not work well. The Controller of Accounts scarcely exercised any effective control, which the Corporation was too unwieldy for the purpose of check or guidance.
The constitution was changed in 1872. The strength of the Corporation was reduced to sixty-four members of whom half were elected by the rate-payers, one-fourth were elected by the resident justices, and the remaining one-fourth were nominated by the Government. The executive authority was vested, as before, in the Commissioner, but the post of the Controller of Accounts was abolished. Instead, provision was made for the weekly audit of accounts by a standing Committee of the Corporation, and monthly audit by paid professional auditors.
This constitution worked fairly well and continued with slight changes till the end of the nineteenth century.
Madras
In Madras the system of government by three Commissioners continued till 1867. By an Act passed in that year, the town was divided into eight wards, and four councilors were appointed for each by the Government.
In 1878 half the members of the Corporation were elected by the rate-payers, but the President and two Vice-Presidents were all salaried officials appointed by the government. In 1884 the principle of election was further extended, and twenty-four out of thirty-two members of the Corporation were elected by the rate-payers.
During Lord Curzon’s Viceroyalty reaction followed, and the Corporation of Madras was reconstituted on the lines of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1899.
Thus after various trials a system of government was evolved for the three presidency towns which had the same essential features, viz., a large Corporation with a proportion of elected members, a strong independent executive authority vested in a Government nominee, with adequate safeguards for checking of accounts and statutory provision for the performance of essential duties, such as sanitation, water-supply, etc. The Government had the right to intervene in case of gross negligence or mismanagement.
Financial Administration
Important changes were introduced in the financial system of India by the Act of 1858. The Secretary of State in Council had now the supreme control of financial administration, and, subject to some discretionary powers vested in the Government of India, no expenditure of Indian revenues could be incurred without the sanction of the India Council. Subject to this control, the Government of India exercised supreme authority over financial administration in India, the Provincial Governments having no power to spend without the sanction of the Governor- General-in- Council. The system of budget was introduced in 1860, and the appropriation of revenues under different items, as provided therein, had to be implicitly followed by the local authorities.
This highly centralised system did not work well. The Provincial Governments having no discretion in matters of expenditure, had little incentive to increase income or economy in expenditure. The Government of India did not possess the requisite knowledge to make an equitable distribution of the available resources over such a vast country. It was inevitable, under these circumstances, that there should be constant friction between the local and central governments. Strachey has very justly observed that under this system “the distribution of the public income degenerated into something like a scramble in which the most violent had the advantage with little attention to reason”.
These glaring defects led to some amount of decentralisation between 1871 and 1877. Under the new scheme centralised subjects like Post Office and Railways were wholly taken over by the Central Government. The receipts from these departments, together with some other sources of revenue, as salt, opium, and customs, were retained wholly by the Central Government. The revenues from other sources, e.g. land-revenue, excise, stamps, forests and registration, were divided between the Provincial and Central Governments, the share of each being determined according to the needs of particular provinces. This settlement of respective shares was subject to periodical review, and readjustment. Under this system the Provincial Governments had to manage their expenses from the revenues assigned to them. They had thus not only more freedom and latitude in spending the revenues they collected, but also a direct interest in increasing the revenues and economising in their expenses.
Of the various heads of revenue referred to above, the land-revenue in different parts of British India and the income derived from the Government monopoly of salt and opium have already been dealt with. The stamp-revenue was really a direct tax on judicial proceedings and commercial transactions; people filing suits in law-courts or entering into business transactions had to affix stamps of specified values on the documents in order to make them legally valid.
