But after the death of Basalat Jang in 1782 the English demanded the cession of Guntur from the Nizam ‘ on the strength of the treaty of 1768. Guntur occupied a position of importance both for the Nizam and the English; for the former it was the only outlet to the sea, and for the latter its possession was necessary to connect their possessions in the north with those in the south. After some hesitation the Nizam surrendered Guntur to the English in 1788 and in return sought their help, according to the treaty of 1768, to recover some of his districts which Tipu had seized. Lord Cornwallis, the then Governor-General, found himself in a delicate position, because the right of the Mysore Sultana to those very territories had been recognised by the English by two separate treaties concluded with Hyder and Tipu respectively in 1769 and 1785; and also because he was precluded by clALLse 34 of Pitt’s India Act from declaring war against Indian powers or concluding a treaty with that object without being previously attacked. But at the same time he was eager to secure allies in view of the (certain war with Tipu. So he wrote a letter to the Nizam on the 7th July, 1789, explaining the treaty of 1768 to suit his motives, and agreeing to support the Nizam with British troops, which could not be employed against the allies of the English, a hat of whom was included, Tipu’s name being deliberately excluded from it. Thus the Nizam joined the Triple Alliance of 1790 and fought for the English in the Third Anglo-Mysore War.
As we have already noted, Sir John Shore, in pursuance of the neutrality policy laid down by Pitt’s India Act, did not lend assistance to the Nizam against the Marathas, who severely defeated him at Kharda in March, 1795.
The Carnatic
The Carnatic, distracted by the Anglo-French conflicts of the mid-eighteenth century, afterwards suffered terribly from the evils of a demoralized administration, due partly to the disreputable character of its Nawab, Mubammad’Ali, and partly to the vacillating and selfish policy of the Madras Government. “The moral atmosphere of Madras appears at this time,” remarks Thornton, “to have been pestilential-‘ corruption revelled unrestrained; and strong indeed must have been the power which could effectually repress it while Mahomet Ali (Muhammad ‘Ali) had purposes to gain and either money or, ,promises to bestow.” Ceasing to reside at Arcot, Muhammad ‘Ali spent his days in a magnificent palace at Chepauk, a fishing village in the suburb of Madras, steeped in pleasure and luxury, to meet the extravagant expenses of which he borrowed lavishly from the Company’s servants at Madras at exorbitant rates of interest, sometimes rising as high as 36 per cont.per annum, and granting them assignments on the land revenues of the Carnatic districts. He was not, declared Burke, “a real potentate”, but “a shadow, a dream, an incubus of oppression”. The “Nabob of Arcot’s Debts”, through which the European bond-holders, including some members of the Madras Council, amassed huge fortunes at the expense of the interests of the kingdom, gave rise to serious administrative scandals and so the British Parliament tried to deal with them. But the Board of Control intervened in the matter and ordered that the debts of the Nawab should be paid out of the revenues of the Carnatic. This decision of the ministry, denounced by Burke and others, dealt a severe blow “at the cause of pure administration in the East “. According to an arrangement dated the 2nd December, 1781, the revenues of the Carnatic had been assigned to British control, the Nawab being given one-sixth for his maintenance. But now that the creditors of the Nawab clamoured for their money, the Board of Control ordered the restitution of the revenues to the Nawab, who went on plunging himself all the deeper into debt.
Thus the relations between Muhammad ‘Ali and the Company were very complicated when Lord Cornwallis came to India as the Company’s Governor-General for the flat time. On the 24th February, 1787, the English concluded a treaty with’the Nawab, by which they agreed to defend the whole country in return for a subsidy of fifteen lacs of pagodas (a coin current in Southern India corresponding at the normal rate of exchange to three and a half rupees). But during the war with Tipu (1790-1792) the Company took into its own hands the entire control of the Carnatic intending “to secure the two states (the Carnatic and Madras) as Malcolm says, “against the dangers to which they thought them exposed from the mismanagement of the Nawab’s officers”. At the close of the war a treaty was concluded on the 12th July, 1792, by which the Carnatic was restored to its Nawab and at the same time the British subsidy was reduced from fifteen lacs of pagodas to nine lacs.
Muhammad ‘Ah- died on the 13th October, 1795, and his son and successor, Omdut-ul-Umara, could not be persuaded by Lord Hobart, Governor of Madras since September, 1794, to modify the treaty of 1792 to the extent of giving to the Company all the territories which had been pledged u security for arrears of pecuniary installments. The new Nawab, “perplexed, plagued and intimidated” by his creditors, would not accede to the proposals. The desire of the Madras governor to go to the length of annexing Tinnevelly was not supported by the Governor-General, Sir John Shore. The corruption in the Carnatic Government continued unabated, owing, as bull aptly expresses it, to “the compound of opposition of the Supreme Government and of the powerful class of individuals whose profit depended upon the misgovernment of the country.
British- Relations with Oudh, Benares and Ruhelkhand
Warren Hastings’ Oudh Policy and the Ruheloa War
Since the Anglo-Oudh treaty of 1765, the Company was definitely resolved to maintain friendly relations with Oudh with a view to utilizing it as a bulwark against the incursions of the Marathas or of the Afghans. Thus when in 1770-1771 the Delhi Emperor, Shah Alam 11, placed himself under Maratha tutelage, Warren Hastings deprived the Emperor of the districts of Kora and Allahabad and made these over to the Nawab of Oudh in return for fifty lacs of rupees and an annual subsidy to maintain a garrison of the Company’s troops for the Nawab’s protection. This arrangement was ratified by the Treaty of Benares, September, 1773, when Hastings had a conference with the Nawab.
