The effect of these victories was to increase the prestige of the English. Mahadaji Sindhia, who had been long aiming at the leadership of the Maratha confederacy and wanted a free hand in Northern India, now Changed his attitude and sought to ally himself with the English. He therefore opened negotiations with them and promised, on the 13th October, 1781, that he would effect a treaty between the English and the Poona Government. The Treaty of Salbai was duly signed on the 17th May, 1782, though it was not ratified by Nana Fadnavis till the 26th February, 1783. By this treaty the English were confirm,-] “M the possession of Salsette, and they recognised Madhava Rao Narayan as the rightful Peshwa; Raghoba was pensioned off; Sindhia got back all the territories west of the Jumni; and Hyder ‘Ali, who was not a party to the treaty, had to give up the territorial which he had conquered from the Nawab of Arcot. Thus the treaty established the status quo ante bellum. The material gains of the English secured by this treaty were not “very impressive “, though they were put to a great financial strain which led Hustings to take recourse to objectionable financial methods. Nevertheless, it marks a turning-point in the history of British supremacy in India. It gave them ” peace with the Marathas for twenty years ” and thus left them comparatively free to fight their other enemies like Tipu and the French and to bring the Nizam and the Nawab of Oudh under their control. But we shall over-emphasis its importance if we say that “it established beyond dispute the dominance of the British as the controlling factor in Indian politics, their subsequent rise in 1818 to the position of a, paramount power being an inevitable result of the position gained b y the Treaty of Salbai “.
As a matter of fact, though Hustings had been able to save the British position in India in the face of an extremely embarrassing situation, it could hardly be regarded as being completely secure. The Company had still to reckon with the jealousy and hostility of the Marathas and Tipu, and to be on guard against the activities of the powers that had been rising in the Punjab, Nepal and Burma. Mr. (later Sir John Macpherson, the senior member of the Council, who acted as the Governor-General for a year and a half till the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, had neither the ability nor the integrity to continue efficiently the policy of his predecessor. Further, section 34 of Pitt’s India Act, 1784, enjoined the Company to follow a policy of non-intervention in Indian politics. Though, owing to the rather insecure position of the Company in India, this policy could not be strictly followed either by Cornwallis or by Shore, yet the period extending from the departure of Hustings till the commencement of Lord Wellesley’s administration W&Er one of comparative political inactivity on the part of the English in India.
The Marathas after Salbai
The Maratha confederacy bad indeed been greatly weakened by this time through the “mutual distrust and selfish intrigues” of its members, who owned only a loose allegiance to it. But there appeared among the Marathas some able personalities like Ahalya Bai Mahadaji Sindhia and Nana Fadnavis. In the words of Sir John Malcolm, whose knowledge of Maratha affairs of the time was hoed on pesonal investigations “the success of Ahalya Baee in the internal administration of her domains was altogether wonderful. In the most sober view that can be taken of her character, she certainly appears, within her limited sphere, to have been one of the purest and most exemplary rulers that ever existed “. Ahalya B&I died in 1795, when the government of Indore passed into the hands of Tukoji Holkar, a good soldier though devoid of political ability. Tukoji’s death in 1797 was followed by chaos and confusion in the Indore kingdom.
Mahadaji Sindhia was the most outstanding Maratha chief of the period. The Treaty of Salbai recognised him as ” as far as related to the British Government an independent prince “, but at the same time he ” continued to observe, on all other points which referred to his connexion with the Poona Government, the most scrupulous attention to forms “. He utilized his new position to extend and consolidate his Authority in Northern India. He soon abandoned the old Maratha method of fighting, maintained in his army a number of Rajputs and Muhammadans, and organized it on European scientific methods by employing Benoit de Boigne, a Savoyard (French) military expert, and other European adventurers of various races and classes. With a view to realising his ambitions in the north he went to Delhi, made the titular Emperor, Shah ‘Alam II, already helpless in the midst of violence, confusion and anarchy, his puppet, and utilized the fiction of his sovereignty to establish Maratha supremacy rapidly in Hindustan. He obtained from the Emperor the office of Wakil-i-mutlug for his nominal master, the Peshwa, and himself became the Peshwa,’s naib or deputy. He also gained the command over the imperial army. In fact, he remained in Northern India as ” the nominal slave but the rigid master of the unfortunate Shah Alum, Emperor of Delhi “. By 1792 Mahadaji established his ascendancy over the Rajputs and the Jats and his power in Northern India reached its “meridian splendour “. He next thought it necessary to establish his influence at Poona, where Nana Fadnavis an astute politician, controlled all affairs, and so proceeded to the south in June, 1792, apparently to pay his respects to the young Peshwa, Madhava Rao 11. During Mahadaji Sindhia’s absence from the north, his neighbour, Tukoji Holkar, challenged his Authority but was severely defeated by his trained troops under de Boigne at Lakheri near Ajmer. Before,his cherished object could be fulfilled, Sindhia died of fever at Poona on the 12th February, 1794, at the age of sixty-seven. His vast possessions and military resources were inherited by his thirteen-year-old nephew and adopted son,