A short struggle for the throne ensued in which Amanullah, a son of the murdered Amlr, came out successful. Partly under the pressure of internal troubles, and partly under the influence of the war party, Amanullah decided to embark on a war with the English. Thus began the Third Anglo-Afghan War (April-May, 1919). The use of aeroplanes, wireless, and high explosives enabled the British Indian army to defeat the Afghan army severely and bomb Jalalabad and Kabul within ten days. The Afghans asked for an armistice on 14th May and a treaty of peace was signed at Rawalpindi on 8th August, 1919, which was confirmed by another treaty concluded on 22nd November, 1921. According to the terms of these treaties, the Afghans were prohibited from importing arms or munitions through India, and the arrears of the late Amir’s subsidy were confiscated by the British Government and no new grant was made to the new Amir; but the British Government expressed their desire to make no attempt to control any longer the foreign relations of Afghanistan, and both the parties agreed to respect each other’s independence. An accredited British minister was henceforth to reside at Kabul, and the Amir was to be represented by one of his own ministers residing in London. Since then Anglo-Afghan relations have continued to be cordial in spite of occasional minor disturbances and Bolshevik activities in Afghanistan.
But soon Afghanistan was convulsed by a civil war. On returning from his European tour in the summer of 1928, Amir Amanullah, full of reforming zeal, tried to introduce certain internal reforms, social, educational and legal, which were not liked by the conservative sections of the people of his kingdom. Their discontent found expression in a civil war and in May, 1929, Amanullah was compelled to abdicate the throne, which was usurped by Bachai-i-Saqqao, a daring adventurer. During the troubles caused by this upheaval, Kabul was cut off from communication with other countries, but the Royal Air Force succeeded in bringing away large numbers of British Indian subjects, many foreigners, and finally, on 25th February, 1929, the Legation itself. While watching the course of the Afghan civil war with grave anxiety, the Government of India followed a policy of “scrupulous non-intervention “. Order was eventually restored in Afghanistan by Muhammad Nadir Shah, a scion of the old ruling house and an able officer of the expelled Amir, who became Amir by general choice. With considerable knowledge of the world, he took up again Amanullah’s mantle of reform, but proceeded with much caution and tact with his schemes of modernization. Relations between Afghanistan and India again became satisfactory. But this course of events was tragically interrupted by the assassination of King Nadir Shah on 8th November, 1933, by a fanatic with a personal grudge. His son, Muhammad Zahir, however, peacefully ascended the throne and wisely continued the policy of his father.
Recently the Indo-Afghan accord has been reaffirmed. India and Afghanistan issued a joint Communique on 24th June, 1974. Both the countries agreed upon ” a far-reaching and wide-ranging programme ” of economic co-operation which “would involve no financial limits”.
Persia
Great Britain had vital interests in the Middle East, and especially in the Persian Gulf, for political as well as commercial reasons, and she guarded these as jealously as possible. But other powers, ‘Like France, Russia, Germany and Turkey, challenged, during the closing years of the nineteenth century, the exclusive influence of Britain in the Persian Gulf and tried to establish their respective control over it. Russian penetration into Northern Persia was particularly a matter of grave anxiety for England. The Government of India vigorously resisted the claims of these powers, and frustrated their efforts. Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, declared in the House of Lords on 5th May, 1903: ” I say it without hesitation, that we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified post in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all means at our disposal.” The first effective steps to counter these anti-British influences in the Persian Gulf were taken by Lord Curzon, who visited the Gulf in 1903 and tried to protect British interests there by several measures, such as the establishment of consulates in the ports and trading centres in the interior, the Seistan Mission of 1903-1905 which under Sir Henry MacMahon brought to a completion the work of boundary delimitation begun in 1872 by Sir Frederick Goldsmith, the projection of a railway from Quetta to Nushki, the construction of a road from, Nushki to Robat Kila, a frontier post, the opening of a postal service along the route and the reorganisation of customs and tariffs.
Soon Persia became subject to grave internal disorders due to the conflict between the forces of constitutionalism, favoured by her people, and the forces of autocracy, represented by the ruling dynasty. England and Russia, however, decided to determine the sphere of their respective interests in Persian territory by a peaceful settlement, and thus signed the Anglo-Russian Convention on 31st August, 1907. According to this, the two parties agreed to pay due regard to the integrity and political independence of Persia. A Russian sphere of influence was demarcated in Northern Persia and a British sphere in the southeastern provinces. Each power agreed in regard to the other’s sphere of influence “not to seek for herself or her own subjects or those of any other country any political to commercial concessions such as railway, banking, telegraph, roads, transport, or insurance “, and not to prevent the other party from acquiring such concessions there.
There is no doubt that the Convention served to avert serious conflicts between England and Russia during the critical period, 1907-1910, when Persia was in a state of chaos which might have tempted any power to intervene in her affairs to further its designs. But it was not above criticism. As Sykes points out, it ” gave grave offence to the Persians “, who were not consulted in the least about the new settlement which vitally affected their destiny. There is much truth in the significant observation of Lovat Fraser, with reference to this agreement, that there is something amazingly cynical in the spirit in which Western powers dispose of the heritage of other races “. In the opinion of some, the Convention gave more advantages to Russia than to England. While the sphere of influence of the former extended over half the territory of Persia, that of the latter was rather too small. But there was one factor, which England could not very well ignore. Russia had already penetrated far too deep into Northern Persia to be asked to retreat quietly, and so, in consideration of this, one has to agree with the statement of Sir J. D. Rees that Great Britain ” had not so much given away advantages as accepted a position that had grown up”.
During the War of 1914-1918, Persia, herself in a miserable condition due to the continuance of internal troubles, declared strict neutrality. But Germany and also her ally Turkey, acting for herself or as the avant-courier of Germany, tried to ” embarrass Great Britain and Russia by creating disturbances in Persia, in Afghanistan and on the frontiers of India, and to force Persia into the World War on their side “. This stirred Great Britain to an unusual activity in the Persian Gulf. However, her relations with Persia continued on the whole to be friendly.
