India under the Crown
The Home Government
THE Act of 1858 put an end to the dual authority exercised by the Board of Control, or rather its President, and the Court of Directors. A parliamentary minister, the Secretary of State for India, was now invested with the powers of supreme control over the Government of India. In view of the general ignorance of English politicians about India, and partly, no doubt, in order to control the exercise of such large powers and patronage by a single individual, a Council was set up to advise the Secretary of State. The Council of India included men of Indian experience. In order to give them independence in the exercise of their duty the members were appointed ” during good behavior “. They were given specific powers, and their consent was needed for the appropriation and expenditure of the Indian revenue, and for the appointment of ordinary members of the Viceroy’s Council. The Secretary of State was not, however, absolutely subject to his Council, and could act on his own authority in urgent and secret matters. It was, however, hoped that the Council would have an effective share in the determination of policy.
But it was soon apparent that the Secretary of State was in a position to ignore his Council on all vital matters. The position was legalised by the act of 1869, which took away most of the powers of the Council, and further provided that its members were to hold office only for a period of ten years, renewable at the pleasure of the Secretary of State. The change was clearly pointed out by Sir Charles Dilke in the House of Commons: ” At the time the Council was appointed the idea was to curb the power of the Secretary of State; that feeling had passed away, and it was now recognised on all hands that the Council should be a consultative and not a controlling body.”
The Secretary of State, like other ministers, was responsible to the British Parliament. But here, again, English politicians generally speaking possessed so poor a knowledge of Indian affairs, and took so little interest in them, that parliamentary control over the Secretary of State for India scarcely ever became a reality.
In practice, therefore, if not in law, the Secretary of State possessed unlimited authority over the Government of India. This had its natural reaction on the relations between the Home Government at Whitehall and the Government in India.
To a superficial observer the Act of 1858 meant nothing more to the Indian Government than a mere change of master. In reality, however, it brought about striking changes.
The concentration of the powers of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control in the hands of a minister of State led to important consequences. To serve two masters may be an irksome business, but it had its obvious advantages. Fully cognisant of the eternal rivalry between the two, a shrewd and able Governor- General could, and often did, play one against the other, and had his own way. Besides, the same rivalry between the authorities stood in the way of their formulating a strong and vigorous policy to which the Indian Government did not subscribe. Further, a minister of State was always likely to be a person of far greater weight than the President of the Board of Control. In the present instance, the Secretary of State, as we have seen above, exercised his large powers practically without any control and could naturally exercise a greater degree of influence. Besides, the Act of 1858 vested the Council of India with large powers over the financial policy of the Government of India. These powers gradually fell into the hands of the Secretary of State and enabled him to exercise an effective control over the Viceroy and his Council.
But in addition to legislative enactments, other factors were at work to enhance the powers of the Secretary of State. The establishment of a direct telegraph line between England and India in 1870, was an event of far-reaching importance. The delay in communication was a great advantage to the Government of India in so far as it of necessity left the initiation of policy in urgent matters to its own hands, and enabled it to confront the Secretary of State with accomplished facts. But all this was bound to change when the Secretary of State had to be kept constantly informed of the course of events in India, and was in a position to issue immediate orders. Henceforth the Secretary of State exercised a far more effective control over the administration of India than was the case before, and the Viceroy really tended to be a mere “agent” of the Secretary of State.
The Indian Government
When the Crown took the Government of India into its own hands in 1858, the supreme legislative and executive authority in India, as we have seen above, was vested in the Governor- General-in-Council. For executive powers it was composed of the Governor- General, the four ordinary members (three officials of ten years’ standing and one barrister), and the Commander-in-Chief, who was an extraordinary member. For legislative purposes six members had been added to this body in 1853.
The change of 1853 marks the modest beginning of a parliamentary system in India, and such deserves special notice. There were, however, two grave defects in the Legislative Council. No Indian element was associated with it, and it’s knowledge of the local conditions outside Bengal was not adequate for making laws for other provinces.
The first of these defects was forcibly realised by many at the time of the Revolt of 1857-59. “The terrible events of the Mutiny brought home to men’s minds the dangers arising from the entire exclusion of Indians from association with the legislation of the country.” Enlightened Indians like Sir Syed Ahmad pointed out the twofold character of this danger. On the one hand it deprived the people of entering any protest against any unpopular measure, while on the other hand the Government had no opportunity of explaining their aims and intentions, which were consequently misunderstood. Even English politicians endorsed the same view. In his able Minute of 1860, Sir Bartle Frere advocated the need of including Indians in the Legislative Council, in order to do away with “the perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people with few means of knowing, except by rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not.”
The spirit of Independence displayed by the Legislative Council from the very beginning disturbed its author, Sir Charles Wood, the President of the Board of Control. “I do not look upon it,” said he, “as some of the young Indians do, as the nucleus and beginning of a constitutional parliament in India.”
