There is no doubt that Nanda Kumar did not receive a fair trial and there was a “miscarriage of justice” at least in respect of the capital punishment inflicted on him. Sir James Stephen states that “if he had to depend upon the evidence called for the prosecution, he would not have convicted the prisoner”. Again the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the indigenous population was doubtful, and the fact is that “the English law making forgery a capital crime was not operative in India till many years after Nanda Kumar’s alleged forgery had been committed”. Further, the judges took the unusual course of themselves cross-examining the defence witnesses “and that somewhat severely”.
It is sometimes said that the execution of Nanda Kumar “was a judicial murder”. It was openly “asserted by some at that time that Mohan Prasad was a creature of Hastings, who influenced the judicial decision against the accused. Nanda Kumar wrote to Clavering that he was the victim of a conspiracy between the Governor-General-in-Council and the Supreme Court. But it should be noted that Impey was not the only judge who tried the case and there were also his colleagues and the jury; and that there is no positive evidence to prove Hastings’ conspiracy with Impey, with whom he was not always on good terms. The conduct of the Council in not trying to save Nanda Kumar seems to be rather mysterious. Francis suggested the idea of appealing for a reprieve, but it was opposed by Clavering and Monson. “It casts,” observes Roberts, “the darkest and most sinister shadow over the reputation of the men who used him for their own purpose and then callously and contemptuously flung him to the wolves.”
In the course of a few years the glaring defects of the Regulating Act became apparent, and fresh attempts were made to devise suitable remedies. The matter was brought to a head in 1783, when the Company was obliged to approach Parliament for financial relief. Burke only voiced the general opinion when he claimed that the relief and reformation of the Company must go together.
The first proposal for reform advocated by Dundas came to nothing. The Bill introduced by Fox was passed in the House of Commons after a long and acrimonious debate, but was defeated in the Lords mainly as a result of the intervention of King George III. Pitt succeeded Fox and introduced a new Bill in January, 1784, and it was passed in August of the same year.
Pitt’s India Act established six “Commissioners for the affairs of India”, viz. a Secretary of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and four Privy Councillors appointed by the King. The body, known popularly as the Board of Control, was to exercise an effective supervision over the Board of Directors. They had access to all the papers of the Company and no dispatches other than those that were purely commercial could be sent without their approval. The power of the Court of Proprietors was considerably reduced, as they could not annul or suspend any resolution of the Board of Directors, which was approved by the Commissioners. These Commissioners were also empowered to send urgent or secret orders through a Secret Committee of the Directors, the approval of the latter being of course a mere formality. The supreme authority thus passed into the hands of the Commissioners, and the Directors retained only their patronage, viz. the right to appoint and dismiss their own servants.
Important changes were at the same time introduced in the Indian administration. The members of the Governor-General’s Council were reduced to three and only the covenanted servants of the Company were made eligible for these posts. The control of the Governor-General in Council over the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay was clearly defined and rendered more effective. By a supplementary Bill, passed in 1786, the Governor-General was authorised in special cases to act against the majority of the Council, and also to hold the office of Commander-in-Chief.
The constitution set up by Pitt’s India Act did not undergo any fundamental change during the existence of the Company’s rule in India. We may therefore pass in rapid review the minor changes that occurred between 1786 and 1858. It may be noted that legis- lative changes during this period were always associated with the renewal of the Company’s Charter in 1793, 1813, 1833 and 1853. As regards the Home Government, the most notable changes were in regard to the Board of Control. Its powers were gradually concentrated in the hands of the President, who thereby virtually became the Cabinet Minister for India.
The Charter Act of 1813 abolished the monopoly of the Company’s Indian trade and laid down “the undoubted sovereignty of the Crown ” in and over the possessions of the East India Company. The Charter Act of 1833 abolished the trading activities of the Company and henceforth it became a purely administrative body under the Crown.
In India, the powers of the Governor-General over the subordinate Presidencies were further enlarged by the Charter Act of 1793, which enabled him to proceed in person to Madras and Bombay and exercise the same authority over their administration as in Bengal. The Charter Act of 1833 not only gave the Governor-General and Council the superintendence, direction and control over the subordinate Presidencies, but also took away from the latter all powers of making laws, and concentrated all legislative authority in the former. Henceforth, with certain necessary exceptions, the Governor-General and Council could make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or Indian, and for all courts of justice, whether established by His Majesty’s charters or otherwise.
In order to enable the Council to discharge these important functions efficiently, a new member with expert knowledge of law was added to it. The Law Member must not be a servant of the Company and could speak and vote only at meetings of the Council which discussed legislative business.
In order to emphasize the superior role which the Governor-General and Council would play over all the Company’s possessions in India, the supreme authority in the country was henceforth designated as the Governor-General of India in Council. The Governor-General in Council also constituted the Government of Bengal, and the Act permitted a member of the Council to be appointed Deputy-Governor of the Province.
The Charter Act of 1853 introduced further change. The number of Directors was reduced to eighteen, of whom three (later six) were to be appointed by the Crown. It took away from them the power of patronage by instituting an open competitive examination for the recruitment of civil servants. The salary of the President of the Board of Control was made equal to that of a Secretary of State, and the approval of the Crown was necessary for all appointments of Councillors, both central and provincial.
As regards the Government of India, the most important changes concerned its legislative function. The Law Member was made an ordinary member of the Governor-General’s Council and no law could be enacted without the assent of the Governor-GeneraL The Council itself was enlarged for legislative purposes by the addition of six new members, called “legislative councillors”. These included four nominees of the four provincial Governments (Bengal, Bombay, Madras and the North-Western Provinces) and the Chief Justice and a puisne Judge of the Supreme Court. The nominated members must be civil servants of at least ten years’ standing. A Law Commission was appointed in London for the codification of Indian laws, and it ultimately led to the enactment of the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Civil Procedure Code.
The changes made by the successive Charter Acts merely sought to carry to its logical conclusion the process that had been begun by North’s Regulating Act and Pitt’s India Act, viz. gradual transference of power and authority from the Company to the Crown. The relation between the two was, throughout this period, a complicated one, and depended to a large extent upon the personality of the President of the Board and his influence with the Cabinet. In addition to initiative, direction and control, a strong President could coerce the Directors into submission in almost every matter, but the latter always possessed to a large extent, the power of resisting and putting obstacles in his way. The right of recalling the Governor-General was always an important instrument in their hands, and no President would lightly risk their determined hostility and desperate resistance. But the inevitable chain of events pointed to the extinction of the Company as the only logical end. After the Charter Act of 1833 the main privilege and justification for the existence of the Company was the appointment of civil servants–a powerful patronage which could hardly be transferred to the Cabinet without danger to British democracy. With the institution of competitive examination for the recruitment of civil servants, this last vestige of effective power was gone, and the way was made clear for the abolition of the Company and the transfer of its powers to the Crown. This end was already visualized by many and must have shortly been realized in the ordinary course even if the Revolt had not suddenly brought it about in an abrupt manner.
