The Peshwa had for long declined to accept the Subsidiary Alliance but now in his helpless situation applied for protection to Wellesley. This was what Wellesley wanted, because it fitted in with his plan of establishing control over the Marathas. Baji Rao II consented to accept the Subsidiary Alliance and signed the Treaty of Bassein on the 31st December, 1802. As provided by this treaty, a subsidiary force, consisting “of not less than 6,000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of field-artillery and European artillery-men”, was to be stationed within the Peshwa’s territory in perpetuity; and for its maintenance, territories yielding revenues worth twenty-six lacs of rupees were surrendered by the Peshwa. Baji Rio II further a not to entertain any European hostile to the English and subjected his relations with other States to the control of the English. Thus he ” sacrificed his independence as the price of protection”. A British force under Arthur Wellesley conducted the Peshwa to his capital and restored him to his former position on the 13th May, 1803.
The Treaty of Bassein forms an important landmark in the history of British supremacy in India. “It was without question”, to quote Dean Hutton, “a step which changed the footing on which we stood in Western India. It trebled the English responsibilities in an instant.” It brought the Company into definite relations with the formal head of the Maratha confederacy, and henceforth it “had either to control the greatest Indian ‘power, or was committed to hostilities with it”. But there is no reason to overestimate its importance by holding, as Owen has done, that “the Treaty by its direct and indirect operations gave the Company the Empire of India “. The British suzerainty over India was certainly not a foregone conclusion in 1803: a great deal had still to be achieved before it could be thoroughly established. The weak points of the Treaty of Bassein were criticized in England in a contemporary paper entitled Observations on the Treaty of Bassein, written by Lord Castlereagh, the successor, in May, 1801, of Dun(las as President of the Board of Control. He was right in pointing, out that it appeared “hopeless to attempt to govern the Maratha Empire through a feeble and perhaps disaffected Peshwa He especially attacked that article of the treaty by which the Peshwa had to accept British arbitration, in his disputes with other powers, and he had a just apprehension of the tendency of the treaty to involve the English “in the endless and complicated distractions of that turbulent (Maratha) Empire”. Wellesley wrongly calculated that after the treaty there existed no reason “to justify an apprehension” of hostility with the Maratha chiefs, though at the same time he realized that even if any war actually broke out the advantages gained by the English as a result of the Treaty of Bassein would help them to meet their opponents successfully.
War was not long in coming. The Treaty of Bassein was, as the Governor-General’s brother, Arthur Wellesley, aptly remarked, “a treaty with a cipher (the Peshwa)”. It wounded the feelings of the other Maratha leaders, who saw in it an absolute surrender of national independence, and by sinking their mutual jealousies for the time being tried to present a united front to the British. The Peshwa, now repentant of his action, sent them secret messages of encouragement. Daulat Rao Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonale II of Bergr at once combined and also tried to win over Jaswant Rao Holkar to their party. But even at this moment of grave national peril the Maraths chiefs could not act together. Though Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsle II mob their troops, Holkar “retired to MaIwa with the real design of being guided by the issue of events ” and took the field when it was too late, and the Gaikwar remained neutral.
Hostilities commenced early in the month of August, 1803. The total strength of the Maratha armies was 256,000 besides 40,000 troops trained by Frenchmen, while the British troops in different of India numbered about, 55,000. But Wellesley was adequately prepared for the coming war. His measures in Mysore and at Surat, his treaties with the Gaikwar and Oudh, and, above all, the Treaty of Bassein “afforded the most efficient means of opposing the confederacy with success “. The English decided to attack the enemy at all points, and the war was conducted in two main centres, in the Deccan under Arthur Wellesley and in Hindustan under General lake-and simultaneously in three subsidiary centres in Gujarat, Bundelkhand and Orissa. The Frenchtrained battalions of the Maratha did not prove very useful, and the European officers in Sindhia’s army mostly deserted him. The Marathas had certainly committed a mistake in abandoning the harassing tactics of their predecessors and in giving preference to Western methods of fighting for which they had to depend on foreigners. It resulted in quick reverses.
In the Deccan, Arthur Wellesley captured Ahmadnagar, on the Nizam’s frontier, on the 12th August, 1803, and on the 23rd September gained a complete victory over the combined troops of Sindhia and Bhonale at Assaye, situated about forty-five miles north of Aurangabad. Grant Duff described this battle as ” a triumph more splendid than any recorded in Deccan history “. Burhanpur and Asirgarh were captured by the English on the 15th October and 21st October respectively. The Bhonale Raja’s forces were completely defeated at Argaon, about fifty miles east of Burhanpur, on the 29th November, and the English captured the strong fortran of Gawilgarh on the 15th December, 1803. In Hindustan, also, success attended British arms. Lake captured Delhi and Agra, and the northern army of the Sindhia was severely routed at the battle of Delhi in the month of September and at Laswari, in Alwar State, in the month of November. The English gained further success in Gujarat, Bundelkhand and Orissa. Thus, in the course of five months, Sindhia and Bhousle had to own severe defeats and conclude two separate treaties with the English. By the Treaty of Deogaon, concluded on the 17th December, 1803, the Bhonsle Raja of Berar ceded to the english the province of Cuttack, including Balasore, and the whole of his territory west of the river Warda. the English were hence forth to arbitrate if he had any disputes with the Nizam or the Peshwa,; and “no European or American or a nation at war with the English or any British subject, was to be entertained without the consent of the British Government”. On his agreeing to maintain a British resident at Nagpur, the Honourable M. Elphinstone was sent there. Sindhia concluded the Treaty of Surji-Arjangaon on the 30th December, by which he gave to the victors all his territories between the Ganges and the Jumna and his forts and territories to the north of the Rajput principalities of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gohad. To the westward he coded to them Ahmadnagar, Broach and all his territories west of the Ajanta Hills. He renounced all his on the Mughul Emperor, the Peshwa, the Nizam and on the British Government; agreed not to admit into his service Europeans of enemy countries or British subjects without the consent of the English; and Sir John Malcolm was appointed dent at his court. By another treaty, concluded on the 27th February, 1804, he entered into a subsidiary alliance, according to which a defence force of 8,000 infantry was to be stationed not in Sindhia’s territory, but near its frontier. As a reward for his loyalty to the English, the Nizam got, from the old possessions of the Raja, of Berar, all territories to the south of Narnulla and Gawilgarh and west of the river Wards, and, from the dominions of Sindhia, districts south of the Ajanta Hills such as Jalnapur and Gondapur.